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There exists a substantial divide between the empirical and survey evidence regarding the influence of 
sell-side analyst recommendations on the trading of mutual funds. While surveys of fund managers 
suggest that they assign little weight to analyst recommendations, the empirical evidence suggests 
their trading is heavily influenced by analyst recommendations. Nonetheless, the existing empirical 
evidence does not readily yield robust inferences as to the direction of causality in the relation 
between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations. Our study thus meets the pressing 
need to undertake a large-sample empirical study to understand the behaviour of these important 
capital market participants.  
 
Employing a robust research design and using a sample many times larger than those used in prior 
studies, we document a positive association between quarterly changes in mutual fund holdings and 
analyst recommendations at the consensus and individual analyst level. Our results thus contradict the 
survey evidence and suggest that the trading of mutual funds is influenced by the recommendations of 
sell-side analysts. Moreover, we find that analysts included in the Institutional Investor All-American 
Research Team exert significantly more influence on the trading of mutual funds than their less 
heralded peers.  
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1.  Introduction 
Mutual funds expend considerable resources to gain timely access to analyst research and 
recommendations (Diefenbach, 1972). Nonetheless, surveys of fund managers consistently indicate 
that although they value analysts’ industry knowledge, they assign little weight to analyst 
recommendations when making portfolio decisions. In 2008, a survey of more than 3,000 fund 
managers published by the industry journal, Institutional Investor, found that managers regard stock 
selection as the least important of 12 sell-side analyst attributes. Indeed, fund managers have ranked 
stock selection as amongst the three least important analyst attributes in each of the Institutional 
Investor surveys since 2005. However, survey responses are not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
actual behaviour.  Indeed, the limited empirical evidence in this area supports the notion that managed 
funds trade in a manner consistent with analyst recommendations. Chen and Cheng (2006), for 
instance, report that changes in aggregate institutional ownership are positively and significantly 
related to the level of consensus recommendations in the same quarter. Moreover, they note that the 
impact of analyst recommendations on the trading of institutional investors is economically 
significant. In dollar terms, institutions increase their holdings of firms with favourable 
recommendations by approximately $US 12 billion each quarter relative to firms with unfavourable 
recommendations. However, Chen and Cheng’s study does not readily yield robust inferences as to 
the direction of causality in the relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst 
recommendations. The contemporaneous relation they report could equally be consistent with the 
notion that analysts change their recommendations in response to the trading of their institutional 
clients. Thus, there remains a pressing need to undertake large-sample empirical analysis to 
understand how mutual funds use the research of sell-side analysts.  
We examine three fundamental questions about the manner in which mutual funds use the research 
of sell-side analysts: 
1. Do mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with sell-side analysts’ recommendations? 
2. Are there certain analysts whose recommendation changes consistently influence the 
trading of mutual funds? 
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3. Are the analysts identified by fund managers as being most skilful more influential than 
their peers? 
Following Chen and Cheng (2006), we hypothesise that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent 
with consensus recommendations and the recommendations of individual analysts. Formally, our first 
hypothesis stated in alternate form is: 
H1: Changes in mutual fund holdings are positively related to the level of (and changes in) sell-
side analysts’ recommendations. 
Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) find that a subset of analysts consistently makes more 
profitable recommendations than their peers. Moreover, they report that the market reaction to 
recommendations issued by these skilful analysts is greater than that for recommendations issued by 
other analysts. Accordingly, we hypothesise that there are a subset of analysts whose 
recommendations consistently exert more influence on the trading of mutual funds than their peers. 
Formally, our second hypothesis stated in the alternate form is: 
H2: Analysts rated as most influential in one period will exhibit significantly greater influence than 
their peers in a subsequent period.  
Stickel (1995) reports that the price reaction to buy recommendations issued by analysts included 
in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team is significantly greater than that associated 
with buy recommendations issued by other analysts. This suggests that analysts who are perceived to 
be more skilful may exert greater influence on the trading of their institutional clients than their less 
highly acclaimed peers. Formally, our third hypothesis stated in the alternate form is therefore: 
H3: Analysts who appear in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team at least once 
during the sample period exert significantly greater influence on the trading of mutual funds than 
analysts that do not. 
Our study makes five significant contributions to the literature. First, we use individual mutual 
fund holdings and detailed analyst recommendations to test whether the recommendation changes of 
individual analysts help to explain the trading of mutual funds at the individual fund level. In contrast, 
prior studies limit their analysis to changes in institutional ownership at the aggregate level and 
analyst recommendations at the consensus level. While we undertake analysis at this level, we also 
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extend the literature by examining the relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst 
recommendations at the individual analyst and fund level. An implication of this research design is 
that we employ a dataset that is many times larger than those used in prior research. Accordingly, our 
study represents by far the most comprehensive investigation of the relation between the trading of 
mutual funds and analyst recommendations undertaken to date.  
Second, our study is the first to include prior quarter recommendation changes as an independent 
variable in the regression analysis. Previous studies consider only the contemporaneous 
recommendation. As previously noted, however, making reliable inferences about the direction of 
causality in the contemporaneous relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst 
recommendations is problematic. In contrast, an analyst’s recommendation cannot possibly be 
influenced by mutual fund trading in the subsequent quarter. Employing this robust research design, 
we find strong evidence that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with the level of and changes 
to analyst recommendations at the consensus and individual analyst level. This result contradicts the 
claims of fund managers, cited in the survey literature, that they assign little weight to the 
recommendations of sell-side analysts. Hence, this study underscores the importance of undertaking 
large sample empirical evidence to understand investor behaviour.  
Third, to explore the possibility of reverse causality or a feedback relation between mutual fund 
trading and analyst recommendations, we perform a series of Granger (1969) causality tests. Our 
results suggest that the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations is 
considerably more complex than has previously been acknowledged in the literature. In particular, we 
find that there is a feedback relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst 
recommendations, such that analyst recommendation changes cause mutual fund trading and mutual 
fund trading causes analyst recommendation changes.  
Fourth, we find evidence that the most influential analysts exhibit persistence in their influence on 
the trading of mutual funds. Previous studies that have examined persistence in analyst skill focus on 
the profitability of an analyst’s recommendations (Mikhail et al., 2004). The results of our tests, 
however, suggest that their search for evidence of persistence in analyst skill may have been 
misplaced. Given the remuneration incentives faced by sell-side equity analysts (Cowen, Groysberg 
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and Healy, 2006), it is arguable that the trading volume their recommendations generate amongst their 
institutional clients is a more accurate measure of their skill than the profitability of their 
recommendations.  
Finally, our results reveal something about the characteristics of those analysts whose 
recommendations exert the greatest influence on the trading of mutual funds. In particular, analysts 
included in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team exert significantly greater 
influence on the trading of these managers than their less heralded peers. Moreover, we find a strong 
positive relation between an analyst’s tenure, the influence they exert on the trading of mutual funds 
and their status as an All-American analyst.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our study and 
the formation of key variables. Section 3 presents our research design. Results are presented in 
Section 4 and Section 5 presents a series of Granger causality tests to examine the direction of 
causality in the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendation changes. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.  Data and variable formation 
We construct our sample from the intersection of mutual funds holdings data from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and analyst recommendations from the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). To be included in our sample, a firm must also have sufficient volume and 
returns data from CRSP and accounting data from I/B/E/S and Datastream to facilitate the 
construction of control variables. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel data set comprised of 
6,535,255 quarterly observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter 
of 2008. 
The CRSP Mutual Funds database provides quarterly snapshots of the holdings of all open-end US 
mutual funds. For each stock held by a fund in a given quarter, CRSP reports the number of shares 
held, the market value of those shares at the reporting date and the percentage of the fund’s total net 
assets invested. The data are collected from reports filed with the SEC and from reports voluntarily 
generated by the funds. In cases where a fund reports its holdings more than once in a single quarter, 
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we retain only the most recently filed holdings. To ensure that our sample is representative of trades 
executed by actively managed, diversified US equity funds, we exclude all trades by index funds, 
taxable and municipal bond funds, international funds and money market funds. In addition, we 
exclude the holdings of funds that do not report holdings in any firm in the quarter previous to or 
following the period of interest. Such infrequent reporting may be indicative of inconsistent reporting 
practices that are likely to introduce noise to the fund ownership variable. 
To infer mutual fund trading at the aggregate institutional level, we begin by defining the variable 
Instk,t , the aggregate level of institutional ownership in stock k at the end of quarter t, as the sum of the 
number of shares of firm k held by all institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database in a 
given quarter.  Our proxy for trading at the aggregate institutional level is then ΔInstk,t, the percentage 
change in the number of shares of firm k held by all funds in the CRSP database from quarter t-1 to t.  
At the individual fund level, we infer trades by reference to the quarterly change in the portfolio 
weights funds apply to the stocks they hold. Focusing on portfolio weights provides a more robust 
proxy for the trading of an individual fund than simply measuring the change in the number of shares, 
as the latter measure is likely to be confounded by changes in funds under management. In particular, 
if funds under management increase, a fund manager whose trading is informed by the 
recommendation changes of sell-side analysts may respond to a recommendation downgrade by 
continuing to hold the same number of shares in the downgraded firm. In this instance, the manager 
effectively decreases their exposure to the stock relative to the total value of their portfolio although 
they have not executed a trade.   
CRSP reports the proportion of a fund’s total net assets invested in a stock as the ratio of the 
market value of the fund’s holdings of that stock relative to the market value of the fund’s entire 
portfolio. Accordingly, quarterly changes in the percentage of total net assets measure reported by 
CRSP do not exclusively reflect trades executed by a fund, but also price changes in the assets 
comprising the fund’s portfolio. Yet changes in portfolio weights that do not arise from trades will 
confound our analysis. To address this potential confound, we estimate an adjusted fund holdings 
measure to remove the impact of price changes and changes in funds under management associated 
with new investment and redemptions. The construction of this variable involves five steps. First, we 
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estimate the theoretical market value of a fund’s holdings of a stock in the current quarter, assuming 
no change in price relative to that on the reporting date in the last quarter as,  
  (1) 
where, Ni,k,t is the number of shares in stock k held by fund i at the end of quarter t and Pk,t-1 is the 
price per share as at the date fund i reported its holdings in quarter t-1. The vast majority of funds in 
the sample hold some proportion of their assets in securities other than equities. Although CRSP only 
reports the percentage of a fund’s total net assets invested in equities, we infer the total market value 
of a fund’s non-equity investments (referred to as bonds for simplicity) as follows: 
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where  Ni,k,t and Pk,t-1 are defined in the manner described above, K is the number of stocks in the 
fund’s portfolio and ωi,k,t is the unadjusted proportion of fund i’s total net assets invested in stock k in 
quarter t as reported by CRSP. For simplicity, we assume that the price of all assets other than equities 
remain unchanged from quarter t-1 to t.  
The sum of (1) and (2) represents the total market value of a fund’s portfolio, assuming no change 
in prices relative to those prevailing when the fund reported its holdings at the end of the previous 
quarter, 
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The adjusted holdings measure is then estimated by dividing (1) by (3), as follows,   
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Finally, ΔHoldingi,k,t , our proxy for the change in portfolio weights attributable to trades executed 
by mutual funds in the current quarter is, 
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, , , , , ,i k t i k t i k tHolding Holding  (5) 
Stock recommendations were obtained from I/B/E/S. Each database record includes the name of 
the firm covered, the brokerage firm and analyst issuing the report and a recommendation on a scale 
from 1 to 5. In I/B/E/S’ scale, a rating of 1 represents a strong buy; 2, a buy; 3, a hold; 4, a sell; and 5, 
underperform. To allow for a more intuitive interpretation of results, we reverse the standard scale so 
that more favourable recommendations are assigned higher numeric values. We retain only the most 
recent recommendation for a stock issued by an analyst during a given quarter. I/B/E/S records a 
recommendation only in instances where an analyst initiates coverage of a stock, revises a previously 
issued recommendation or reiterates their recommendation. To ensure that there is a recommendation 
in each quarter during which a stock is covered by an analyst, we retain an analyst’s last outstanding 
recommendation in subsequent quarters until they reiterate or revise their recommendation or cease 
coverage of the stock. Finally, to ensure that our analysis is not capturing stale recommendations, we 
limit our sample to analyst-firm observations with at least one recommendation change in the current 
or previous quarter.  
 
3. Research design 
To test whether mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with the recommendations of sell-side 
analysts, we perform a series of cross-sectional, Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. We estimate 
the regressions on a quarterly basis and report the quarterly and time-series average coefficient 
estimates in the tables. The t-statistics and corresponding p-values are based on time series standard 
errors estimated in accordance with the Fama and Macbeth procedure to control for potential cross-
sectional correlation in error terms. Importantly, this analysis is not confounded by the increasing 
prevalence of institutional ownership through time because the analysis compares firms that 
experience recommendation changes and those that do not within the same quarter. For completeness, 
we also estimate the regressions on a pooled sample basis. By necessity, the pooled sample 
regressions impose a single relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst 
recommendations throughout the entire sample period. Yet imposing this restriction may be 
inappropriate, as the weight that a fund manager assigns to analyst recommendations may vary 
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through time. In light of this limitation of the pooled sample regressions, we focus upon the quarterly 
Fama and Macbeth regressions in our analysis.  
We undertake our analysis at two levels. First, following the prior literature, we examine whether 
changes in aggregate institutional ownership are explained by (i) the level of consensus 
recommendations and (ii) changes in consensus recommendations. Second, we exploit the rich panel 
of detailed analyst recommendations and fund holdings to test whether the recommendation changes 
of individual analysts can help to explain the trading of mutual funds at the individual fund level. 
   
3.1  Consensus recommendation levels 
To test the hypothesis that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with the level of consensus 
recommendations, we estimate the following regression: 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 1 7 , 8 , 1 ,
k t k t k t k t k t
k t k t k t k t k t
Inst Cons rec Liquid Vol Sales growth
Ret Lag ret Surprise Lag Inst
 (6) 
where ΔInstk,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from 
quarter t-1 to t and Lag cons reck,t  is the consensus recommendation for stock k at the end of 
quarter t-1. We include the lagged value of the consensus recommendation as the primary 
explanatory variable in this regression to confront the look-ahead bias that threatens 
inferences as to the direction of causality in the contemporaneous relation between mutual 
fund trading and analyst recommendations. Hypothesis 1 predicts that β1 will be significantly 
greater than zero, indicating that, on average, mutual funds increase their holdings of stocks 
with more favourable consensus recommendations. We also include control variables for 
factors relating to mutual fund preferences, momentum trading and institutional herding that 
have been shown to exhibit power to explain the trading of mutual funds. Del Guercio 
(1996), Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) report that mutual funds tend to 
purchase large, highly liquid stocks that have more volatile returns and have experienced 
strong recent sales growth. Accordingly, we control for a firm’s year-to-date sales growth and 
the percentage change in liquidity and returns volatility from quarter t-1 to t. We measure 
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Sales growthk,t  as the sum of quarterly sales in quarter t-3 to t, divided by the sum of sales in 
quarter t-4 to t-7, less one. We measure ΔLiquidk,t as the mean daily trading volume for stock 
k in quarter t divided by the mean daily trading volume in quarter t-1, less one.  ΔVolk,t  is the 
standard deviation of firm k’s daily stock returns in quarter t less the standard deviation of 
daily returns in quarter t-1. We control for price and earnings momentum signals as Grinblatt, 
Titman and Wermers (1995) report that the vast majority of mutual funds use momentum as 
one of their stock selection criterion. To control for price momentum, we include the 
quarterly stock return and the lagged quarterly stock return. We measure the quarterly stock 
return as  , where rm,k  is the stock return for stock k in month 
m. To control for earnings momentum, we include the variable Surprisek,t. Following, Doyle, 
Lundholm and Soliman (2006), we measure Surprisek,t  as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual 
earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast 
preceding the announcement date, scaled by the closing market price per share on the last 
trading day in the quarter. To ensure that stale forecasts do not confound this control, we 
require that the forecast be within three months of the earnings announcement.   
Sias (2004) finds that institutional investors engage heavily in herd-like behaviour, following one 
another into and out of trades. We therefore include the change in aggregate institutional ownership in 
stock k from quarter t-1 to t to control for institutional herding. Instk,t  is measured as the sum of the 
number of shares in stock k held by all institutional investors who report their holdings in the CRSP 
Mutual Funds Database during a given quarter.  
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find that the trading of mutual funds is strongly positively 
correlated with future stock returns. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the trading of institutional 
investors prompts analysts to change their recommendations. In an attempt to differentiate this 
alternative hypothesis from our hypothesis that the trading of mutual funds is influenced by analyst 
recommendations, we include the lagged dependent and primary independent variables in all of our 
tests to introduce elements of a Granger causality test (Granger, 1969). Including the lagged value of 
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the dependent variable in the regression also has other desirable characteristics. Embedded within this 
number is the complete, but unobservable set of factors that explained the trading of mutual funds in 
the previous quarter.  To the extent that these factors persistently explain the trading of mutual funds, 
including the lagged value of the dependent variable increases confidence that a statistically 
significant coefficient on the recommendation variable is not merely the spurious consequence of 
omitted variables. 
  
3.2 Consensus recommendation changes 
To test the hypothesis that mutual funds trade in a manner that is consistent with changes in the 
level of consensus recommendations, we estimate the following regression: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 1 10 , 11 , 1 ,
k t k t k t k t
k t k t k t k t
k t k t k t k t k t
Inst Cons upgrade Cons downgrade Lag cons upgrade
Lag cons downgrade Liquid Vol Sales growth
Ret  + Lag ret Surprise Lag Inst
 (7) 
where ΔInstk,t is defined in the manner described above, Cons upgradek,t  (Lag cons upgradek,t-1) is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k at the end 
of quarter t (t-1) is more favourable than that outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 (t-2) and 0 
otherwise; Cons downgradek,t  (Lag cons downgradek,t-1)  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k at the end of quarter t  (t-1) is less favourable than that 
outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 (t-2) and 0 otherwise and the control variables are defined in the 
same manner outlined above.   
To address the concern that a contemporaneous relation between changes in institutional 
ownership and consensus recommendation changes may arise because of a look-ahead bias, we 
include both the contemporaneous and lagged recommendation change as independent variables. No 
prior study has adopted this research design. Accordingly, our study has the potential to elicit more 
definitive inferences about the direction of causality in any relation between mutual fund trading and 
analyst recommendations.  
We conduct t-tests to assess whether individual variables are significantly different from zero and 
Wald tests to determine whether the coefficients on the recommendation upgrade variables are 
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significantly different from those on the downgrade variables. Hypothesis 1 predicts that β1 and β3 
will be significantly greater than zero, indicating that mutual funds increase their holdings of stocks 
that experience a consensus recommendation upgrade. Similarly, hypothesis 1 predicts that β2 and β4 
will be significantly less than zero, indicating that mutual funds decrease their holdings of stocks that 
experience a consensus recommendation downgrade. Further support for hypothesis 1 would be 
provided if β1 (β3) is significantly greater than β2 (β4). 
 
3.3 Detailed analyst recommendations and mutual fund holdings  
 
To test the hypothesis that mutual funds adjust their portfolio weights in a manner consistent with 
the recommendation changes of individual analysts, we estimate the following regression: 
, , 0 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , 1
4 , , 1 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 1 10 , 11 ,
12 , ,
i k t j k t j k t j k t
j k t k t k t k t
k t k t k t k t
i k t
Holding Upgrade Downgrade Lag upgrade
Lag downgrade Liquid Vol Sales growth
Ret Lag ret Surprise Inst
Lag Holding 1 , ,i k t
 (8) 
where ΔHoldingi,k,t  (Lag ΔHoldingi,k,t) is the change in the proportion of fund i’s total net assets 
invested in stock k from quarter t-1 (t-2) to quarter t (t-1), adjusted to remove the impact of price 
changes and changes in funds under management, Upgradej,k,t  (Lag upgradej,k,t-1) is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation for stock k at the end of quarter t (t-1) 
is more favourable than that outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 (t-2) and 0 otherwise, Downgradej,k,t 
(Lag downgradej,k,t-1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation 
for stock k at the end of quarter t (t-1) is more favourable than that outstanding at the end of quarter t-
1 (t-2) and 0 otherwise and the control variables are defined in the manner outlined above. 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics for the mutual fund holdings included in the sample are presented in Table 1. 
The final sample of 6,535,255 quarterly observations includes holdings for 4,074 distinct mutual 
funds. The funds in the sample hold an average of 67.72 stocks in their portfolio in any given quarter, 
with the average holding in a single stock accounting for approximately 0.62 percent of a fund’s total 
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net assets.
1
 On average, when the funds in the sample trade they reduce their holdings in a stock by 
0.05 percent. Consistent with expectations, the distribution of changes in fund holdings has a median 
of zero and is slightly negatively skewed, indicating that the funds in the sample execute many small 
trades and very few large trades. The mean change in aggregate institutional ownership for a 
representative stock in a single quarter is 3.12 percent, consistent with increasing levels of 
institutional ownership throughout the sample period. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of mutual fund holdings 
This table reports summary statistics for the mutual fund holdings included in the sample. The final sample of 6,535,255 quarterly 
observations incorporates holdings data for 4,074 mutual funds from CRSP during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the 
final quarter of 2008. The second row outlines the average number of stocks held by the funds in the sample in a quarter. It is 
computed by averaging the number of stocks held by each of the funds that report in a given quarter and then averaging across the 
22 quarters in the sample. Holdingi,k,t is the proportion of a fund’s total net assets invested in a stock in a given quarter, adjusted for 
the impact of price changes in the stocks comprising the fund’s portfolio and changes in funds under management associated with 
new investment and redemptions. It is measured as,  
 
where Nt  is the number of shares held by fund i in stock k , Pt-1 is the price of stock k as at the date the fund reported its holdings in 
quarter  t-1 and ωi,k,t, is the unadjusted proportion of fund i’s total net assets invested in stock k at the end of quarter t, as reported by 
CRSP. ΔHoldingi,k,t is the change in the proportion of fund i’s total net assets invested in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t. It is 
measured as ΔHoldingi,k,t = Holdingi,k,t - ωk,t , where  Holdingi,k,t is defined as above and ωi,k,t is the proportion of fund i’s total net 
assets invested in stock k at the reporting date in period t-1. ΔInstk,t is the percentage change in the level of aggregate institutional 
ownership of stock k from quarter t-1 to t, where Instk,t is the level of aggregate institutional ownership in stock k in quarter t is 
measured as the sum of the number of shares in firm k held by all institutions recorded in the CRSP Mutual Funds database. 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Skewness Kurtosis 
Total number of funds 4,074       
Stocks per fund-quarter 67.72 5.30 64.45 66.57 69.56 1.37 1.35 
Holdingi,k,t 0.62% 0.86% 0.03% 0.22% 0.90% 
1.99 4.14 
ΔHoldingi,k,t -0.05% 0.38% -0.06% 0.00% 0.04% 
-1.51 7.69 
ΔInstk,t 3.12% 27.99% -9.92% 2.45% 15.91% 0.22 1.51 
 
In Panel A of Table 2, we present summary statistics for the analyst recommendations included in 
the sample. The final sample of 6,535,255 observations includes 94,686 distinct quarterly 
recommendations issued by 4,834 analysts during the period from the third quarter of 23003 to the 
                                                     
1
 The product of the average number of stocks held by a fund and the average proportion of a fund’s total net 
assets invested in a single stock is approximately 42 percent. That this figure is significantly less than 100 
percent merely reflects the fact that the vast majority of funds in the sample hold some proportion of their funds 
in assets other than equities. Given that this is not a performance evaluation study there is no pressing need to 
exclude funds where the proportion of equities does not meet a defined threshold in order to ensure a consistent 
risk profile across funds.  
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final quarter of 2008. The mean recommendation in our sample, 3.48, is midway between a hold and a 
buy, and is of a similar magnitude to that reported by Jegadeesh et al. (2004). On average, the analysts 
in our sample cover 2.36 stocks in a representative quarter, while the average firm is covered by 
approximately 2.60 analysts in a given quarter. This level of coverage is significantly lower than that 
described by Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001). They report that the average analyst 
covered 13 firms and that the average firm was covered by approximately 4.74 analysts during the 
period from 1985 – 1996. The disparity in our results is primarily attributable to differences in our 
sample selection procedures. While Barber et al. consider all recommendations, we only retain 
observations where there is a recommendation change in the current or previous quarter. Imposing 
this criterion results in a substantial reduction in sample size, but provides for a more powerful test. In 
sensitivity analysis (not reported in the paper) we relax this restriction and find that the inferences are 
qualitatively unchanged. 
Table 2: Summary statistics of analyst recommendations 
This table presents summary statistics for the analyst recommendations included in the sample. The final sample of 
6,535,255 observations incorporates 94,686 quarterly recommendation observations issued by 4,834 analysts between the 
third quarter of 2003 and the final quarter of 2008. All recommendations data is obtained from the I/B/E/S detailed 
recommendations file. The first two columns of Panel A describe the number of analysts and recommendations included in 
the sample. Column three of panel A reports the mean level of all recommendations issued during the sample period on a 
scale from one to five, where one represents an underperform recommendation and five represents a strong buy. Column 
four reports the average number of firms covered by a single analyst in a representative quarter. It is computed by averaging 
the number of firms each analyst covers within a quarter and then averaging across the 22 quarters in the sample. In Column 
five we present the average number of analysts covering a single firm in a representative quarter, computed by averaging the 
total number of analysts covering a firm in each quarter and then averaging across the 22 quarters in the sample. Panel B 
reports a frequency distribution of recommendations. 
Panel A: Analyst recommendations 
Number of analysts 
Number of 
recommendations 
Mean recommendation 
Covered firms per 
analyst-quarter 
Analysts per covered 
firm-quarter 
4,834 94,686 3.48 2.36 2.60 
Panel B: Recommendation frequency 
Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Underperform 
N Percent 
of total 
N Percent 
of total 
N Percent 
of total 
N Percent 
of total 
N Percent 
of total 
19,177 20.25% 21,208 22.40% 43,889 46.35% 6,909 7.30% 3,503 3.70% 
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Panel B of Table 2 presents a frequency distribution of the analyst recommendations included in 
our sample. Consistent with the findings of Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2006) the 
distribution of analyst recommendations exhibits an obvious optimism bias. Buy and strong buy 
recommendations account for 42.65 percent of all recommendations in our sample, while sell and 
strong sell recommendations account for just 11 percent. The magnitude of this optimism bias is 
similar to that reported by Barber et al. (2006) over the latter part of their sample from 1996 – 2003.  
In Table 3, we present descriptive statistics for the sample data. The final sample consists of 
6,535,255 observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. 
The size of the sample is a striking feature of our study, making it by far the most comprehensive 
investigation of the association between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations 
undertaken to date. Approximately 55 percent of the firms in the sample experience a 
recommendation change in any given quarter. Note, however, that the apparent frequency of 
recommendation changes is a result of our research design. In particular, we only retain observations 
where an analyst issues at least one recommendation for a stock in the current or previous quarter. 
This restriction was imposed in order to exclude stale recommendations. Consistent with the notion 
that markets became increasingly liquid throughout the period of the study, the mean quarterly change 
in average daily trading volume, ΔLiquidk,t is 10.22 percent. While this seems like a particularly large 
increase in trading volume over a single quarter, note that the distribution of the change in liquidity is 
positively skewed, with a median change of 5.33 percent. A factor that may partially explain the trend 
of increasing liquidity throughout the sample period is increasing institutional ownership, as 
evidenced by the mean value of Δ Instk,t of 3.12 percent. The substantial mean year-to-date Sales 
growthk,t (20.53 percent) experienced by the firms in the sample points to the prosperous economic 
conditions prevailing throughout much of the sample period. Interestingly, however, the mean 
quarterly stock return, Retk,t during the sample period is negative (-1.20 percent).  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample data. The final sample consists of 6,535,255 observations during the 
period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Upgradej,k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. 
Downgradej,k,t ¸is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less 
favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Lag upgradej,k,t-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. Lag 
downgradej,t-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is less 
favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. ΔLiquidk,t is the percentage change in the average daily trading 
volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to t.  ΔVolk,t is the change in the standard deviation of firm k’s daily stock returns from quarter t-1 
to t. It is measured as ΔVolk,t =σk,t  - σk,t-1 . Sales growthk,t is the sum of sales in quarters t-3 to t, divided by the sum of sales in 
quarters t-4 to t-7, minus one. Retk,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where rm,k is 
the stock return for stock k in month m. Lag rett is the lagged quarterly return on stock k. Surprisek,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted 
I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement 
date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of quarter t. ΔInstk,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional 
ownership in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t. The aggregate institutional ownership in quarter t is measured as the sum of the 
number of shares of stock k reported as being held by institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database. Lag ΔHoldingi,k is 
the lagged quarterly change in fund i’s holding of stock k, defined as Lag ΔHoldingi,k  = Holdingi,k,t-1 -  ωi,k,t following the procedure 
outlined in Table 1. 
Panel A 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Skewness Kurtosis 
Total number of firms  4,087       
Upgradej,k,t 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.11 -0.78 
Downgradej,k,t 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 -1.01 
Lag upgradej,k,t-1 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.04 -0.92 
Lag downgradej,k,t-1 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.99 -1.02 
ΔLiquidk,t 10.22% 29.59% -10.81% 5.33% 25.56% 1.05 1.54 
ΔVolk,t 0.31% 0.97% -0.25% 0.08% 0.61% 1.57 3.46 
Sales growthk,t 20.53% 24.72% 6.19% 15.19% 29.26% 1.69 4.65 
Retk,t -1.20% 17.04% -10.91% -0.01% 9.51% -0.31 0.39 
Lag retk,t 1.69% 15.58% -7.96% 1.61% 11.14% 0.06 0.28 
Surprisek,t 0.00% 0.55% -0.02% 0.04% 0.13% -6.50 65.00 
ΔInstk,t 3.12% 27.99% -9.92% 2.45% 15.91% 0.22 1.51 
Lag ΔHoldingi,k 0.05% 0.20% -0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 2.61 13.20 
 
In Table 4 we present the Pearson correlations between changes in the holdings of individual 
mutual funds, detailed analyst recommendation changes and the control variables. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that there is a positive association between changes in mutual fund holdings and analysts’ 
recommendation upgrades, the Pearson correlation between ΔHoldingi,k,t and  the contemporaneous 
and lagged Upgrade indicator variables are positive (0.009 and 0.005 respectively) and highly 
significant. Similarly, there is a significantly negative association between changes in mutual fund 
holdings and analysts’ recommendation downgrades. Encouragingly, all of the control variables 
except Sales growthk,t and Surprisek,t exhibit significant correlations with the dependent variable. 
Further supporting the specification of the model, there is no significant evidence of collinearity. The 
maximum Pearson correlation between independent variables is less than 0.50. The correlations 
between Upgradej,k,t and the control variables imply that analysts tend to issue recommendation 
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upgrades for stocks that experience increases in liquidity and volatility and that exhibit characteristics 
of earnings and price momentum. Similarly, they tend to issue recommendation downgrades to stocks 
that have recently produced disappointing earnings announcements and that have had poor stock 
returns.  
   
Table 4: Pearson correlations 
 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlations between changes in mutual fund holdings, analyst recommendation changes and control variables related to mutual fund preferences, momentum 
trading and institutional herding. All correlations are based on 6,535,255 observations during the 22 fiscal quarters from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. The correlations are 
computed in each quarter and then averaged across the 22 quarters. The level of significance is based on the associated time-series standard errors estimated in accordance with the Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) procedure. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two sided test. See Tables 1-3, above, for variable measurement. 
 ΔHolding Upgrade Down 
grade 
Lag  
upgrade 
Lag  
Downgrade 
ΔLiquid ΔVol Sales Growth Ret Lag ret Surprise ΔInst Lag ΔHolding 
ΔHolding 
1.000***             
Upgrade 
0.009*** 1.000***            
Downgrade 
-0.012*** -0.360*** 1.000***           
Lag Upgrade 
0.005*** -0.328*** -0.227*** 1.000***          
Lag 
Downgrade 
-0.003** -0.157*** -0.347*** -0.376*** 1.000***         
ΔLiquid 
-0.014*** 0.044*** 0.131*** -0.068*** -0.104*** 1.000***        
ΔVol 
-0.010*** 0.036*** 0.118*** -0.067*** -0.080*** 0.495*** 1.000***       
ΔSales Growth 
-0.004 -0.012 0.020** -0.002 0.002 0.023* 0.005 1.000***      
Ret 
0.017*** 0.069*** -0.101*** 0.011 0.023*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.025 1.000***     
Lag Ret 
0.015*** -0.009 0.010 0.074*** -0.079*** 0.067*** 0.019 0.003 0.006 1.000***    
Surprise 
0.005 0.019*** -0.029*** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.055*** -0.053*** 0.028*** 0.127*** 0.071*** 1.000***   
ΔInst 
0.048*** 0.006 -0.005 0.009* -0.009** 0.025*** -0.005 0.024 0.061*** 0.057*** -0.011 1.000***  
Lag ΔHolding 
-0.077*** 0.000 0.001 0.004** -0.005** -0.001 -0.003 0.043*** -0.003 -0.010** 0.006** -0.007** 1.000*** 
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4.2 The impact of analyst recommendations on the trading of mutual funds 
In this section, we present the results of the analysis of whether mutual funds trade in a manner 
consistent with analyst recommendations. We undertake this analysis at two levels. Following the 
prior literature, we first consider whether changes in aggregate institutional ownership are explained 
by (i) the level of consensus recommendations and (ii) changes in consensus recommendations. 
Second, we extend the literature by using detailed mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations 
to test whether the recommendation changes of individual analysts help to explain the trading of 
mutual funds at the individual fund level. The latter question has never been addressed in the literature 
and the former question has never been addressed using detailed analyst recommendations and 
individual fund holdings. Framing the research question in this manner acknowledges that fund 
managers are likely to perceive certain analysts to be more skilful than others and are therefore likely 
to assign differing levels of importance to the recommendations of different analysts. Moreover, by 
undertaking the analysis using the detailed data at the individual fund and analyst level, we employ by 
far the largest database that has been used to test whether analyst recommendations inform the trading 
decisions of mutual fund managers. Our study is therefore likely to elicit more subtle and robust 
inferences than prior research. 
 
4.2.1 Aggregate institutional ownership and the consensus recommendation level  
Table 5 presents the results of the regression of changes in aggregate institutional ownership on the 
level of the consensus recommendation in the previous quarter.
2
 Note that the mean adjusted R
2
 
statistic in the quarterly regressions is just 5.76 percent. Thus, our model explains somewhat less of 
the variation in aggregate institutional ownership than Chen and Cheng (2006), who report an average 
R
2
 statistic of 12.8 percent.  Careful analysis of the adjusted R 
2 
statistics in Panel A of Table 5, 
however, suggests that the comparatively limited explanatory power of our model may simply reflect 
the different sampling period considered. In particular, our model exhibits impressive explanatory 
                                                     
2
 We also estimate a regression in which the contemporaneous consensus recommendation enters the regression 
as the primary explanatory variable. The results of this regression (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those 
presented in Table 1 and are available from the authors by request. 
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power in the first year of the sample but the mean adjusted R
2
 statistic is heavily influenced by the 
limited explanatory power of the model in the second half of 2006 and 2007. 
We incorporate the lagged value of the consensus recommendation in this regression in order to 
confront the threat of a look-ahead bias in regressions relating the change in institutional ownership to 
recommendations issued in the same quarter. Panel A of Table 1 presents the results of a series of 
cross-sectional, Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions estimated on a quarterly basis. Panel B presents the 
results of a regression estimated on a pooled sample basis. The results provide support for the notion 
that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with the level of consensus analyst recommendations. 
On average, an increase of one level in the consensus recommendation (from hold to buy, for 
instance) is associated with an increase in aggregate institutional ownership of approximately 0.291 
percent in the following quarter. Consistent with the findings of Del Guercio (1996), changes in 
institutional ownership are positively and significantly related to changes in liquidity. This is 
consistent with the notion that institutional investors face constraints to holding large positions in 
illiquid stocks arising from the need to meet redemptions (Gompers & Metrick, 2001). Moreover, 
because institutional investors trade frequently, their performance is likely to be highly sensitive to 
trading costs. It follows that they may be discouraged from investing in illiquid stocks that are 
characterised by large bid-ask spreads. As liquidity increases these constraints are likely to be less 
binding. Prior research, including that of Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) finds a positive relation between institutional ownership and returns volatility. 
Contrary to these findings, the average coefficient on ΔVolk,t,  is negative (-0.544) and marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level. As hypothesised, the coefficient on Sales growthk,t is positive 
(0.046) and significant at less than the one percent level. This result is consistent with prior evidence 
that institutional investors exhibit a preference for stocks with strong recent operating performance 
(Gompers & Metrick, 2001). Grinblatt et al. (1995) report that the vast majority of mutual funds use 
momentum as one of their stock selection criteria. Consistent with this finding, the coefficients on the 
quarterly stock return and lagged quarterly stock return are both positive (0.112 and 0.148 
respectively) and significant at less than the one percent level. The coefficient on Surprisek,t, is 
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negative (-0.038), but insignificant at usual levels of significance. Doyle et al. (2006) document that 
the stocks that experience the greatest earnings surprise tend to be neglected stocks, characterised by 
high transaction costs, a high degree of illiquidity and limited institutional ownership. The 
insignificance of the earnings surprise variable may therefore reflect the existence of barriers to 
institutional ownership amongst the stocks that experience the greatest earnings surprise. Lag ΔInstk,t-1, 
the lagged quarterly change in aggregate institutional ownership, is negative (-0.115) and highly 
significant. The results therefore provide no evidence of institutional herding (Sias, 2004) but are 
consistent with aggregate changes in institutional ownership following a mean reverting process, 
perhaps driven by funds attempting to exploit what they perceive to be market inefficiencies. 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Regression of changes in aggregate institutional ownership on the consensus recommendation and control variables 
This table presents the results of the following regression, 
 
where, the dependent variable, , is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership for stock k from quarter t -1 to quarter t and   is the sum of the number of shares in stock k 
held by all institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database.   is the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t computed by averaging all outstanding 
recommendations in the quarter. ΔLiquidk,t is the percentage change in average daily trading volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t.  ΔVolk,t is the change in the standard deviation of firm k’s daily 
stock returns from quarter t-1 to t. It is measured as ΔVolk,t = . Sales growthk,t is the sum of sales in the four most recent fiscal quarters (t-3 to t) divided by the sum of sales in quarters t-4 to 
t-7, minus one. Retk,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where  is the return for stock k in month m. Lag retk,t is the lagged quarterly return on stock k. 
Surprisek,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market 
price per share at the end of quarter t. Lag ΔInstk,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1 and is defined in the same manner as the 
dependent variable, outlined above. The sample consists of 50,878 firm-quarters, during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Panel A presents the results of a series of 
quarterly Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. Panel B presents the results of a pooled sample regression. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Panel A: Quarterly Fama-Macbeth regression  
Year Qtr Intercept Cons rec Lag cons rec ΔLiquid ΔVol Sales Growth Ret Lag Ret Surprise Lag ΔInst Adj 
R2(%) 
Number 
Obs. 
2003 3 -0.016  0.283 0.092*** -2.002 0.002 0.090* 0.170*** -0.698 -0.350*** 16.70 1,686 
2003 4 -0.100**  0.000*** 0.035 -2.096 0.077*** 0.118** 0.137*** -1.693 -0.385*** 19.62 1,887 
2004 1 -0.091**  0.082* 0.019 0.505 0.049** 0.201*** 0.069 -1.818 -0.331*** 13.49 2,103 
2004 2 0.000  0.000*** 0.032 -0.287 0.074*** 0.136*** 0.139*** 3.165** -0.241*** 8.58 1,991 
2004 3 0.189***  0.307 0.019 -2.108** 0.006 0.207*** 0.134*** -1.282 -0.086*** 3.47 2,225 
2004 4 -0.131***  0.013** 0.045*** -0.328 0.042** 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.117 -0.013 2.61 2,318 
2005 1 -0.008  0.319 0.040** -0.773 0.031 0.018 0.108*** 0.269 -0.162*** 2.10 2,392 
2005 2 -0.087**  0.014** 0.050*** -3.743*** 0.057*** 0.241*** 0.175*** -0.173 -0.129*** 5.96 2,430 
2005 3 -0.215***  0.000*** 0.092*** -3.506*** 0.052*** 0.090*** 0.226*** 0.070 -0.139*** 6.51 2,330 
2005 4 -0.041  0.928 0.049** 0.426 0.033 0.152*** 0.215*** 1.429 -0.166*** 3.90 2,451 
2006 1 0.135***  0.460 0.034 -1.201 -0.002 0.180*** -0.012 -1.260 -0.202*** 4.75 2,196 
2006 2 0.150***  0.823 0.040** -0.600 0.085*** 0.046 0.362*** -0.537 -0.003 4.10 2,355 
2006 3 0.064**  0.601 0.017 -0.363 0.048*** 0.133*** 0.088*** -0.070 0.080*** 2.40 2,569 
2006 4 -0.013  0.354 0.011 -0.994 0.052*** 0.099*** 0.126*** 2.074*** -0.002 1.52 2,713 
2007 1 0.032  0.531 0.008 2.742*** 0.017 -0.011 0.187*** -1.770 -0.122*** 2.16 2,654 
2007 2 0.100***  0.207 0.002 -0.061 0.000 -0.006 0.142*** 0.920 -0.050*** 0.83 2,657 
2007 3 -0.032  0.339 0.028** 0.517 0.068*** 0.151*** 0.116*** 0.128 0.020 3.33 2,711 
2007 4 -0.097**  0.000*** 0.047** -0.243 0.029 0.116*** 0.088** -0.547 -0.113*** 1.91 2,553 
2008 1 0.587***  0.068* 0.078*** 0.040 0.104*** 0.132*** 0.220*** 0.824 -0.239*** 10.11 2,359 
2008 2 0.024  0.511 -0.015 -0.554 0.092*** 0.058** 0.184*** 1.293** 0.063*** 4.00 2,255 
2008 3 -0.104**  0.002*** 0.017 1.669*** 0.020 0.163*** 0.179*** 0.070 -0.027 2.73 2,402 
2008 4 -0.555***  0.567 0.012 0.406 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.038** -1.036*** 0.072*** 5.93 1,641 
Avg Coeff -0.009  0.291*** 0.034*** -0.571* 0.045*** 0.114*** 0.148*** -0.024 -0.115*** 5.76 50,878 
p-value 0.828  0.000 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.931 0.001   
Panel B: Pooled sample regression  
Coeff 0.009  0.015*** 0.100*** -6.703*** 0.040*** 0.062*** 0.040*** 0.481*** -0.108*** 5.22 50,878 
p-value 0.366  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000   
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4.2.2 Aggregate institutional ownership and consensus recommendation changes 
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis of whether changes in the consensus recommendation explain 
changes in aggregate institutional ownership. The results provide moderate evidence that mutual funds trade in a 
manner consistent with changes in the consensus recommendation. The average coefficients on both the Cons 
upgradek,t and Cons downgradek,t indicator variables in the quarterly analysis in Panel A are essentially zero and 
are insignificant at usual levels of significance (p-values of 0.958 and 0.993 respectively). Similarly, although the 
lagged recommendation change variables carry the expected signs, they are insignificantly different from zero at 
conventional levels. Importantly, however, a Wald test reveals that the average coefficient on Lag cons upgradek,t-
1 is significantly greater than that on Lag cons downgradek,t-1. Accordingly, mutual funds appear to increase their 
holdings of stocks whose consensus recommendations are upgraded relative to stocks that experience a 
recommendation downgrade. The results of the pooled sample regression presented in Panel B of Table 6  provide 
even stronger support for the notion that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with analysts’ consensus 
recommendation changes. In this specification Cons upgradek,t  is positive (0.010) and significant at less than the 
one percent level, while Cons downgradek,t carries the expected sign but is insignificant at conventional levels. 
The lagged recommendation change variables carry the expected signs and are both significant at less than the one 
percent level. Moreover, Wald tests reveal that the difference between the contemporaneous and lagged 
recommendation upgrade and downgrade variables are both statistically significant.  
Consistent with the prior literature and the findings presented in Table 5, ΔLiquidk,t, is positive (0.035) and highly 
significant. The positive association between changes in liquidity and changes in aggregate institutional 
ownership is consistent with frictions to institutional ownership easing as liquidity increases. Interestingly, 
changes in liquidity seem to drive changes in aggregate institutional ownership independently of changes in the 
measures of operating performance.  The Pearson correlation between the change in liquidity and sales growth is 
just 2.3 percent while that between the lagged quarterly stock return and liquidity is only 6.7 percent.  The 
coefficient on ΔVolk,t is negative in and significant at less than the eight percent level. This apparent preference for 
lower volatility amongst fund managers contradicts prior research, such as that of Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein 
(1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001), who find that institutions exhibit a preference for more volatile stocks. 
This inconsistency with the prior literature may reflect the different sample period considered. In particular, our 
sample period follows closely after the bursting of the technology bubble. The negative association between 
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changes in mutual fund holdings and changes in volatility in our sample period may therefore reflect a flight to 
safety following the substantial losses incurred during the earlier market downturn. The relation between sales 
growth and changes in aggregate institutional ownership is positive (0.051) and highly significant, suggesting that 
the funds in the sample have a preference for glamour stocks with strong recent operating performance. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue persuasively that this preference is likely explained by the need for 
institutions to justify their portfolios to investors. Changes in aggregate institutional ownership are strongly 
positively related to the contemporaneous quarterly stock return and lagged quarterly stock return. The mean 
quarterly coefficient on Retk,t is 0.113 and is highly significant. The mean quarterly coefficient on Lag retk,t, is of a 
similar magnitude (0.150) and is also significant at less than the one percent level. This finding is in conformance 
with prior evidence that finds that mutual funds engage heavily in momentum trading (Grinblatt et al., 1995). 
There is no consistent relation between changes in aggregate institutional ownership and earnings surprise, 
computed in accordance with the procedure outlined by Doyle et al. (2006). When the model is estimated on a 
quarterly basis, the coefficient on Surprisek,t is negative (-0.046)  but insignificantly different from zero. In 
contrast, the coefficient on Surprisek,t in the pooled regression is positive (0.046) and highly significant. In light of 
the limited significance of the individual quarterly coefficients and their apparent instability, as evidenced by the 
frequency with which the quarterly coefficients switch from positive to negative, we interpret these results as 
supporting the conclusion that there is no relation between earnings surprise and changes in aggregate institutional 
ownership. This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers the evidence of Doyle et al. that the stocks that 
experience the greatest earnings surprise tend to be neglected stocks characterised by barriers to institutional 
ownership. The coefficient on the lagged quarterly change in aggregate institutional ownership, Lag ΔInst, is 
negative (-0.114) and significant at less than the one percent level. This result is inconsistent with institutions 
engaging in herding (Sias, 2004). Rather, it is suggestive of a mean reverting process in aggregate institutional 
holdings, perhaps driven by the attempts of funds to exploit what they perceive to be temporary mispricing. 
 
 
  
Table 6: Regression of changes in aggregate institutional ownership on changes in the consensus recommendation and control variables 
This table presents the results of the following regression, 
 
Where, the dependent variable, , is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership for stock k from quarter t -1 to t and  is the sum of the number of shares in stock k held by 
all institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database. Cons upgradek,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more 
favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Cons downgradek,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less 
favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Lag cons upgradek,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is more 
favourable than that in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. Lag cons downgradek,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in period t-1 is less favourable 
than that outstanding in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. ΔLiquidk,t is the percentage change in average daily trading volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to  t. ΔVolk,t is the change in the standard deviation of 
firm k’s daily stock returns from quarter t-1 to t. It is measured as ΔVolk,t = . Sales growthk,t is the sum of sales in the four most recent fiscal quarters (t-3 to t) divided by the sum of sales in 
quarters t-4 to t-7, minus one. Retk,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where  is the stock return for stock k in month m. Lag retk,t is the lagged quarterly 
return on stock k. Surprisek,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t  less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, 
scaled by the market price per share at the end of quarter t. Lag ΔInstk,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-2 to  t-1 and is defined in the same manner 
as the dependent variable. The sample consists of 50,878 firm-quarters, during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Panel A presents the results of a series of quarterly 
Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. Panel B presents the results of a pooled sample regression. *,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. # denotes instances where the coefficient on Cons upgradek,t (Lag cons upgradek,t-1) is significantly different to the Cons downgradek,t (Lag cons downgradek,t-1) coefficient at the 10% level 
or better, applying a Wald test. 
 
  
  
 
Panel A: Quarterly Fama-Macbeth regression  
Year Qtr Intercept Cons 
upgrade 
Cons 
downgrade 
Lag cons 
upgrade 
Lag cons 
downgrade 
ΔLiquid ΔVol Sales 
Growth 
Ret Lag Ret Surprise Lag ΔInst Adj R2(%) Number Obs. 
2003 3 0.051*** -0.029 -0.004 -0.042
* -0.016 0.089*** -2.126 0.008 0.096* 0.175*** -0.587 -0.344*** 16.85 1,686 
2003 4 0.123*** -0.015 0.013 -0.020 -0.044
*** 0.039* -2.331* 0.110*** 0.116** 0.140*** -1.499 -0.393*** 18.95 1,887 
2004 1 -0.067*** 0.048*** 0.035** 0.036
** 0.052*** 0.025 0.279 0.052** 0.209*** 0.083* -2.281* -0.330*** 14.52 2,103 
2004 2 0.202*** 0.008 0.002 -0.003 -0.019 0.031 -0.347 0.101*** 0.136*** 0.159*** 2.872* -0.238*** 7.53 1,991 
2004 3 0.166*** -0.021 -0.024* -0.021 0.006 0.024 -1.987* 0.001 0.203*** 0.136*** -1.206 -0.088*** 3.68 2,225 
2004 4 -0.055*** -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.046*** -0.450 0.051*** 0.155*** 0.165*** 0.145 -0.011 2.24 2,318 
2005 1 0.042*** -0.005# -0.046
*** -0.008 -0.006 0.042** -0.561 0.034* 0.015 0.117*** 0.335 -0.166*** 2.47 2,392 
2005 2 0.024** 0.002 -0.013 -0.027
** -0.028* 0.052*** -3.931*** 0.067*** 0.240*** 0.187*** -0.184 -0.131*** 5.90 2,430 
2005 3 -0.007 -0.012 -0.004 -0.039
*** -0.046*** 0.096*** -3.821*** 0.071*** 0.099*** 0.236*** 0.043 -0.139*** 6.11 2,330 
2005 4 -0.095*** 0.037** 0.054*** 0.099
***
 0.063
*** 0.052** -0.041 0.029 0.126*** 0.205*** 1.356 -0.155*** 6.51 2,451 
2006 1 0.209*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.010 -0.042
*** 0.034 -0.772 0.002 0.173*** 0.001 -1.259 -0.195*** 5.89 2,196 
2006 2 0.171*** -0.031** -0.023 -0.031
** -0.023 0.038** -0.549 0.085*** 0.038 0.362*** -0.333 -0.013 4.55 2,355 
2006 3 0.045*** -0.001 0.014 0.005 -0.016 0.014 -0.407 0.045*** 0.134*** 0.081** -0.112 0.082*** 2.48 2,569 
2006 4 -0.073*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.028
** 0.026** 0.014 -1.100 0.047*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 1.931*** 0.003 2.46 2,713 
2007 1 0.099*** -0.049*** -0.034*** -0.038
** -0.047*** 0.008 2.772*** 0.019 -0.006 0.174*** -1.438* -0.116*** 3.76 2,654 
2007 2 0.151*** 0.010 0.003 -0.008 -0.030
** -0.001 -0.130 0.005 0.000 0.140*** 0.897 -0.051*** 0.91 2,657 
2007 3 -0.076*** 0.041#
***
 0.020
** 0.007 -0.006 0.023* 0.533 0.069*** 0.146*** 0.114*** 0.089 0.019 3.98 2,711 
2007 4 0.095*** -0.008 -0.028** -0.026
* -0.029* 0.050** -0.047 0.046** 0.117*** 0.100*** -0.529 -0.107*** 1.72 2,553 
2008 1 0.469*** 0.017 0.014 0.046
*** 0.055*** 0.078*** -0.157 0.095*** 0.139*** 0.225*** 0.576 -0.231*** 10.84 2,359 
2008 2 -0.032*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.048 0.020 -0.012 -0.684 0.087*** 0.046* 0.176*** 1.114** 0.050*** 5.49 2,255 
2008 3 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.030 -0.001 0.010 1.464*** 0.033* 0.158*** 0.177*** 0.085 -0.029 2.58 2,402 
2008 4 -0.562*** -0.014** -0.010 -0.001 0.002 0.013 0.366 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.036** -1.017*** 0.072*** 6.03 1,641 
Avg Coeff 0.041 0.000 -0.001 0.001# -0.006 0.035
*** -0.638* 0.051*** 0.113*** 0.150*** -0.046 -0.114*** 6.16 50,878 
p-value 0.321 0.958 0.993 0.857 0.426 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.862 0.001   
Panel B: Pooled sample regression  
Avg Coeff 0.064*** 0.010#
*** -0.003 0.007#
*** -0.017** 0.100 -6.713*** 0.047*** 0.060*** 0.039*** 0.464*** -0.108*** 5.26 50,878 
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.370 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000   
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4.2.3 Detailed mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendation changes 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression of changes in mutual fund holdings on the recommendation 
changes of analysts at the individual fund and analyst level. Note that the mean adjusted R
2
 statistic in Panel A of 
Table 7 is just 1.30 percent. This rather limited explanatory power primarily reflects the enormous cross-sectional 
variation in the quarterly changes in mutual fund holdings. While previous studies that have examined aggregate 
changes in institutional ownership and consensus recommendations have achieved adjusted R
2 
statistics of nearly 
13 percent, we consider changes in individual mutual fund holdings and detailed analyst recommendations. 
Accordingly, both our dependent and primary independent variables exhibit considerably more noise than prior 
studies.  
Contrary to the survey evidence that fund managers assign little weight to analyst recommendations 
(Institutional Investor, 2008), the regression analysis presented in Table 7 provides strong support for the notion 
that their trading is influenced by the recommendation changes of sell-side analysts. On average, when an 
individual analyst upgrades their recommendation for a stock, the representative mutual fund responds by 
increasing the weight applied to that stock in their portfolio by 0.004 percent. Similarly, the representative fund 
responds to an individual analyst’s recommendation downgrade by decreasing the weight applied to that stock in 
their portfolio by -0.006 percent. In total therefore, the average mutual fund increases their holdings of a stock that 
is upgraded by a single analyst by 0.010 percent relative to a stock that is downgraded by an analyst. In both 
instances, t-tests indicate that the change in mutual fund holdings is significant at less than the five percent level. 
Moreover, this relation appears to be highly stable throughout the sample period. The quarterly coefficient on 
Upgradej,k,t is significantly positive in 15 of the 22 quarters, while the quarterly coefficients on Downgradej,k,t 
exhibit a clear negative trend. The mean quarterly coefficient on Lag upgradej,k,t-1 is essentially zero and is 
insignificant at usual levels of significance, but Lag downgradej,k,t-1 is negative and highly significant. 
Nonetheless, a Wald test indicates that the coefficient on Lag upgradej,k,t-1 is significantly greater than that on Lag 
downgradej,k,t-1 at  better than the ten percent level. Thus, despite the likelihood that the influence of analyst 
recommendations on the trading of mutual funds will diminish over time, there remains a significant association 
between prior recommendation changes and changes in mutual fund holdings. Importantly, the significance of the 
lagged recommendation change variables is not affected by the look-ahead bias that threatens inferences as to the 
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direction of causality in the contemporaneous relation. Accordingly, our results provide support for the hypothesis 
that the trading of mutual funds is influenced by the recommendation changes of sell-side analysts.  
At first glance, the change in mutual fund holdings implied by our results may appear to be economically 
insignificant. However, the small magnitude of these changes is unsurprising when one considers that the funds in 
our sample hold just 0.62 percent of their total net assets in any single stock. The economic impact of these 
changes is further brought into focus when one considers that the reaction we report is that of a single fund to the 
recommendation change of a single analyst.  
Contrary to the findings of prior research (Del Guercio, 1996; Gompers and Metrick 2001) and the results 
presented in Tables 1 and 2, above, the mean coefficient on ΔLiquidk,t is negative and highly significant. This 
result may be consistent with the notion that fund managers seek to exploit instances of mispricing in illiquid 
stocks because the greater efficiency of highly liquid stocks makes it difficult to generate abnormal returns. The 
coefficients on ΔVolk,t  and Sales growthk,t are negative but insignificant at usual levels of significance. Consistent 
with the findings of Grinblatt et al. (1995), the coefficients on Retk,t and Lag retk,t-1 are positive and strongly 
significant, implying that many of the funds in our sample use price momentum as a stock selection criterion. In 
contrast, there is no apparent relation between the proxy for earnings momentum, Surprisek,t, and changes in 
mutual fund holdings. This result is consistent with the findings presented in Table 5  and Table 6, above, and 
likely reflects the existence of barriers to institutional ownership amongst the stocks that experience the greatest 
earnings surprise (Doyle, 2006). In accordance with prior research that finds that institutional investors engage in 
heard-like behaviour (Sias, 2004), the coefficient on ΔInstk,t, the contemporaneous quarterly change in aggregate 
institutional ownership is positive and highly significant.  Note, however, that the significantly negative 
coefficient on Lag ΔHoldingi,k,t-1 suggests that the change in a fund’s holdings of a stock in the current quarter is 
strongly negatively associated with its change in holdings in the prior quarter. The process of mean reversion in 
holdings that this implies is consistent with the notion that the fund managers in our sample attempt to exploit 
what they perceive to be instances of temporary mispricing. 
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Table 7: Regression of changes in individual mutual fund holdings on detailed analyst recommendation changes and control variables 
This table presents the results of the following regression, 
 
 
Where,  is the change in the proportion of fund i’s total net assets invested in stock k from quarter t-1to quarter t, adjusted to remove the impact of price changes in the stocks comprising 
the fund’s portfolio and changes in funds under management associated with redemptions and new investment. It is computed as , and, 
 
where Nt is the number of shares of stock k held by fund i, Pt-1 is the price of stock k as at the date the fund reported its holdings in quarter t-1 and ωi,k,t  is the unadjusted proportion of fund i’s total net 
assets invested in stock k at the end of quarter t, as reported by CRSP. Upgradej,k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more favourable 
than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Downgradej,k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less favourable than that 
outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Lag upgradej,k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is more favourable than that outstanding 
in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. Lag downgradej,k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s  recommendation for stock k in period t-1 is less favourable than that outstanding in quarter 
t-2 and 0 otherwise. ΔLiquidk,t is the percentage change in average daily trading volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t.  ΔVolk,t is the change in the standard deviation of firm k’s daily stock 
returns from quarter t-1 to t. It is measured as ΔVolk,t = . Sales growthk,t is the sum of sales in the four most recent fiscal quarters (t-3 to t) divided by the sum of sales in quarters t-4 to t-7, 
minus one. Retk,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where  is the stock return for stock k in month m. Lag retk,t is the lagged quarterly return on stock k. 
Surprisek,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t  less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market 
price per share at the end of quarter t. Lag ΔInstk,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1 and is defined in the same manner as the 
dependent variable, outlined above. The sample consists of 6,535,255 quarterly observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Panel, A presents the results of 
a series of quarterly Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. Panel B presents the results of a pooled sample regression. *,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. # denotes instances where the coefficient on Upgradej,k,t (Lag upgrade,k,t-1) is significantly different to the coefficient on Downgradej,k,t (Lag downgradej,k,t-1) at the 
10% level or better, applying a Wald test. 
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Panel A:  Quarterly Fama-Macbeth regression  
Year Qtr Intercept Upgrade Down- 
grade 
Lag 
upgrade 
Lag 
downgrade 
ΔLiquid ΔVol Sales 
Growth 
Ret Lag Ret Surprise ΔInst Lag 
ΔHolding, 
Adj R2(%) Number Obs. 
2003 3 -0.039
*** 0.001# -0.011
*** 0.000# -0.016
*** -0.027*** 0.301 -0.011*** 0.087*** 0.065*** -0.158 0.053*** -0.101*** 0.60 226,543 
2003 4 -0.060
*** 0.015#
*** 0.001 0.004# -0.003 -0.060
*** -0.336 -0.037*** 0.093*** 0.020*** 1.003*** 0.018*** -0.088*** 0.62 255,003 
2004 1 -0.053
*** 0.007#
** -0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.008** -1.935*** 0.011*** 0.107*** 0.017*** 0.270 0.023*** -0.090*** 0.42 258,289 
2004 2 -0.044
*** -0.002# -0.015
*** 0.000# -0.005
* -0.023*** -1.719*** 0.003 0.120*** 0.033*** 0.003 0.102*** -0.132*** 1.45 226,355 
2004 3 -0.072
*** 0.008#
** -0.002 0.007#
** -0.007** -0.039*** -0.053 0.009*** 0.058*** 0.061*** -0.957*** 0.105*** -0.102*** 0.82 234,112 
2004 4 -0.022
*** 0.001# -0.008
** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.021*** -0.371* -0.037*** 0.031*** 0.082*** 1.238*** 0.159*** -0.208*** 1.65 239,392 
2005 1 -0.041
*** 0.003# -0.003 0.003# -0.007
** 0.003 0.678*** 0.010*** -0.006 0.070*** 0.854*** 0.163*** -0.150*** 1.38 247,892 
2005 2 -0.034
*** 0.009#
*** -0.008** 0.008#
** -0.002 -0.007* -0.358** -0.010*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.419 0.125*** -0.260*** 2.43 235,802 
2005 3 -0.029
*** -0.014#
*** -0.018*** -0.005# -0.012
*** -0.015*** -0.203 0.000 0.048*** 0.018** -0.951*** 0.089*** -0.251*** 1.85 205,496 
2005 4 -0.071
*** 0.028#
*** 0.010** -0.004 0.000 -0.067*** 0.780*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.067*** -2.890*** -0.023*** -0.201*** 1.02 211,109 
2006 1 -0.056
*** 0.005# -0.010
*** -0.009#
** -0.005 -0.020*** 0.135 0.014*** 0.110*** 0.060*** 0.115 0.114*** -0.198*** 1.56 209,784 
2006 2 -0.050
*** 0.003# -0.006
* -0.007#
** -0.011*** -0.005 -0.946*** 0.009*** 0.080*** 0.060*** 0.658*** 0.082*** -0.152*** 1.01 247,423 
2006 3 -0.062
*** 0.008#
** -0.011*** 0.001# -0.005 -0.017
*** -0.860*** 0.008** 0.032*** 0.064*** -0.922*** 0.131*** -0.077*** 0.63 270,377 
2006 4 -0.034
*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.007#
*** -0.011*** -0.030*** 1.086*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.023*** -0.904*** 0.145*** -0.117*** 0.77 328,856 
2007 1 -0.035
*** 0.010#
*** -0.012*** 0.007#
** -0.005* -0.015*** -0.167 0.013*** -0.011 0.067*** 3.379*** 0.148*** -0.046*** 0.92 314,742 
2007 2 -0.020
*** 0.000# -0.017
*** -0.004# -0.010
*** 0.003 -0.096 -0.007*** -0.017*** 0.013** 0.549*** 0.112*** -0.163*** 1.25 321,305 
2007 3 -0.006
** -0.003# -0.007
*** 0.002# -0.005
** 0.011*** -0.201* -0.004 0.005 0.010** -0.032 0.138*** -0.125*** 1.07 306,391 
2007 4 -0.018
*** -0.002# -0.012
*** -0.008** -0.009*** -0.077*** 1.302*** -0.014*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.236*** 0.108*** -0.238*** 2.03 260,493 
2008 1 0.001 0.002# -0.009
*** -0.005* -0.002 0.005* -2.575*** 0.024*** -0.002 0.025*** -0.577*** 0.044*** -0.023*** 0.47 308,748 
2008 2 -0.064
*** 0.001# -0.005
** 0.002 0.000 -0.041*** -0.399*** -0.024*** -0.115*** -0.038*** -0.155* 0.044*** -0.311*** 5.37 458,764 
2008 3 -0.125
*** 0.010#
*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.012*** -0.015*** 0.503*** -0.038*** -0.059*** -0.016*** -0.114* 0.079*** -0.018*** 0.41 745,794 
2008 4 -0.011
** 0.006*** 0.004 0.004#
* -0.001 -0.011*** 0.942*** -0.011*** 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.165** 0.063*** -0.189*** 0.91 422,585 
Avg Coeff -0.043*** 0.004#
** -0.006*** 0.000# -0.005
*** -0.021*** -0.204 -0.002 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.056 0.092*** -0.147*** 1.30 6,535,255 
p-value 0.000 0.046 0.002 0.953 0.001 0.000 0.336 0.687 0.012 0.000 0.822 0.000 0.000   
Panel B: Pooled sample regression 
Avg Coeff -0.046*** 0.008#
*** -0.006*** 0.002#
*** -0.002*** -0.020*** 0.447*** -0.003*** 0.008*** 0.036*** 0.066** 0.059*** -0.143*** 0.76 6,535,255 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000   
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4.3 Persistence in analyst influence 
 
To assess the influence of an analyst’s recommendation changes on the trading of mutual funds, we employ a 
two-stage least squares regression framework. In the first stage, we estimate the predicted change in a fund’s 
holdings of a stock associated with factors other than an analyst’s recommendation change by estimating the 
following regression: 
 
, , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , , , ,
i k t k t k t k t k t
k t k t k t i k t i k t
Holding Liquid Vol Sales growth Ret
+ Lag ret Surprise Inst Lag Holding
 (9) 
In the second stage, we regress the residuals from (1), which reflect the component of a fund’s change in 
holdings that is unexplained by the control variables, against the contemporaneous and lagged recommendation 
change indicator variables, as follows: 
 
, , 0 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , 1
4 , , 1
i k t j k t j k t j k t
j k t
Upgrade Downgrade Lag upgrade
Lag downgrade
 (10) 
Next, we compute the Cook’s D influence measures associated with the recommendation variables for each 
stock covered by an analyst in a quarter. We then average all of the Cook’s D influence measures for an analyst in 
a single quarter to obtain an aggregate measure of the analyst’s influence in that quarter. Analysts are then ranked 
into influence percentiles based on their average Cook’s D influence measure within a quarter. Finally, an 
analyst’s percentile ranks in each quarter are averaged longitudinally in order to derive a single measure of 
influence, the mean influence rank. 
To test whether analysts exhibit persistence in their influence on the trading of mutual funds, we allocate 
analysts to groups of above- and below-median influence based on their mean influence rank during the pre-test 
period from the third quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2006. The composition of these groups is then held 
constant throughout the subsequent 11 quarter test period. At the end of the test-period the mean influence ranks 
of the groups are re-measured and a two-sample t-test is performed to determine whether there is a significant 
difference in their ranks. In this analysis, a finding that the mean influence rank of the above-median influence 
group remains significantly greater than that of the below-median group would support the inference that there are 
certain analysts who persistently influence the trading of mutual funds. In an attempt to understand the 
characteristics that make an analyst influential in the trading of mutual funds, we also measure the mean tenure 
and trades for the two groups of analysts. We define tenure as the number of quarters during the sample in which 
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an analyst makes at least one recommendation change. Trades represents an alternative proxy for an analyst’s 
influence on the trading of mutual funds and is defined as the number of cases in which an analyst’s 
recommendation change is associated with a trade by a mutual fund during a single quarter.  
The results of the tests of persistence in analyst influence are documented in   
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Table 8. The first four columns outline the pre-test mean and median percentile influence rankings, tenure and 
matched trades of groups of analysts identified as being of above- and below-median influence during the 
formation period of 11 quarters from the third quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2006. Columns five to eight of 
the table report the influence, tenure and matched trade statistics of these groups at the end of the subsequent 11 
quarter test period, holding the composition of the groups constant based on their influence rankings during the 
formation period.  
The results presented in Table 8 and depicted in Figure 1 support the notion that there are certain analysts 
whose recommendation changes consistently influence the trading of mutual funds. Almost three years after 
analysts were allocated to influence groups based on their formation period ranks, the analysts identified as being 
most influential remain significantly more influential than their peers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there appears to be 
some degree of mean reversion in the influence of analysts as the sample period progresses. Over the test period 
of 11 quarters, the mean influence rank of the above-median influence group declines from 65 percent to 56 
percent. In contrast, that of the below-median group increases from 31 percent to 43 percent. Nonetheless, the 
difference between the mean influence ranks of the above- and below-median groups, 13 percent, is highly 
statistically significant.  
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Figure 1: Mean pre- and post-test influence rankings of analysts and above- and below-median influence 
This figure depicts the pre- and post-test mean influence ranks of analysts identified as being of above- and below-median influence in the 
pre-test period. The mean influence rank proxies for an analyst’s relative influence on the trading of mutual funds and is estimated as 
follows: First, we regress the quarterly change in a fund’s holdings of a stock, ΔHoldingi,k,t against the control variables from equation (1) 
in order to estimate the expected change in holdings associated with factors other than an analyst’s recommendation changes. We then 
regress the residuals from this regression on the recommendation change indicator variables and estimate the Cook’s D influence measures 
associated with the coefficients. Next, we compute an average Cook’s D influence measure across all stocks covered by an analyst within a 
quarter, and assign each analyst a percentile ranking based on the average Cook’s D statistic associated with their recommendations within 
the quarter. We then average an analyst’s quarterly percentile rankings longitudinally over the first 11 quarters of the sample, sort the 
analysts into groups of above and below median influence and measure the mean influence rank of the groups. The composition of these 
groups is held constant during the remaining 11 quarters and the mean influence ranks are remeasured at the end of the sample period.  
 
Interestingly, a defining feature of the most influential analysts appears to be their greater tenure than less 
influential analysts. On average, analysts in the above-median influence group appeared in the database in 6.0 of 
the 11 quarters to the end of the test period, while those in the below-median group appeared an average of 5.2 
times. Though seemingly small in an absolute sense, this difference is significant at less than the one percent 
level. At the end of the test period, the average tenure of the above-median group (10.68 quarters) remains 
significantly greater than that of the below-median influence group (9.57 quarters). 
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Table 8: Persistence in the influence of sell-side analysts on the trading of mutual funds 
This table reports the results of the tests of persistence in analyst influence. The first four columns outline the pre-test mean and median 
percentile influence rankings, tenure and matched trades of groups of analysts identified as being of above- and below-median influence 
during the formation period of 11 quarters from the third quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2006. Columns five to eight of the table 
report the influence, tenure and matched trade statistics of these groups at the end of the subsequent 11 quarter test period, holding the 
composition of the groups constant based on their influence rankings during the formation period. The mean influence rank proxies for an 
analyst’s relative influence on the trading of mutual funds and is estimated as follows. First, we regress the quarterly change in a fund’s 
holdings of a stock, ΔHoldingi,k,t against the control variables from equation (9) in order to estimate the expected change in holdings 
associated with factors other than an analyst’s recommendation changes. Next, we regress the residuals from this regression on the 
recommendation change indicator variables and estimate the Cook’s D influence measures associated with the coefficients. We then 
compute an average Cook’s D influence measure across all stocks covered by an analyst within a quarter, and assign each analyst a 
percentile ranking based on their average Cook’s D influence measure. Finally, we average an analyst’s quarterly percentile rankings 
longitudinally over the first 11 quarters of the sample, sort the analysts into groups of above- and below-median influence and measure the 
Mean influence ranks of the groups. The composition of these groups is held constant during the remaining 11 quarters and the Mean 
influence ranks are remeasured at the end of the sample period. Tenure measures the number of quarters in which an analyst appears in the 
database, while Trades measures the number of mutual fund trades that an analyst’s recommendations are matched with in a quarter. The 
sample consists of 6,535,255 observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. *, ** and *** indicate 
that the difference between the mean statistics for the above- and below-median influence groups are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels respectively. 
 Formation period (t = 1-11)  Test period (t = 12 – 22) 
 Mean 
 influence  
rank 
(%) 
 
 
Median 
influence  
rank 
(%) 
 Mean 
tenure 
(quarters) 
 Mean 
trades 
 Mean 
influence 
rank 
(%) 
 Median 
influence 
rank 
(%) 
 Mean 
tenure 
(quarters) 
 Mean 
trades 
Above median 65.45  63.15  5.99  140.15  56.31  56.83  10.68  216.79 
 
Below median 
31.49  34.73  5.23  70.54  42.85  43.10  9.57  141.88 
Above - Below 33.96***  28.42  0.76***  69.61***  13.46***  13.73  1.11***  74.91 
 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations presented Table 9 in confirm the inferences drawn from the test of 
persistence in analyst influence. The Pearson correlation between an analyst’s tenure and their mean influence 
rank is positive (0.126) and highly significant, implying that the most influential analysts also tend to be more 
experienced.  
Table 9: Pearson and Spearman correlations between analyst influence, tenure and trades 
This table presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between an analyst’s mean influence rank, tenure and trades. The mean influence 
rank proxies for an analyst’s influence on the trading of mutual funds and is estimated as follows: First, we regress the quarterly change in 
a fund’s holdings of a stock, ΔHoldingi,k,t against the control variables from equation (9) in order to estimate the expected change in 
holdings associated with factors other than an analyst’s recommendation change. We then regress the residuals from this regression on the 
recommendation change indicator variables and estimate the Cook’s D influence measures associated with the coefficients. Next, we 
compute an average Cook’s D influence measure across all stocks covered by an analyst within a quarter, and assign each analyst a 
percentile ranking based on their relative scores within the quarter. Finally, to obtain a measure of an analyst’s influence across the entire 
sample, we average the analyst’s percentile rank longitudinally throughout the sample period. Tenure measures the number of quarters in 
which an analyst appears in the database, while Trades measures the number of cases in which an analyst’s recommendation changes were 
matched with the change in holdings of a mutual fund. The sample consists of 6,535,255 observations during the period from the third 
quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the bottom left corner of the Table and 
Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in the upper right corner. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively.  
 Mean influence rank Tenure Trades 
Mean  influence rank 1.000 0.132*** 0.354*** 
Tenure 0.126*** 1.000 0.488*** 
Trades 0.302*** 0.347*** 1.000 
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That there is a positive relation between an analyst’s tenure and their influence on the trading of mutual funds 
emerges clearly from the results presented in Tables 8 and 9. The direction of causality in this relation, however, 
is less clear. Two hypotheses could be put forward to explain such a relation. The first, the natural selection 
hypothesis, implies that influential analysts are somehow more skilful than their peers and achieve longer tenure 
because their recommendations prompt institutional trading, generating commissions for their brokerage firms and 
ensuring their continued employment. In contrast, analysts who are uninfluential generate few commissions, cease 
to be employed and drop out of the sample. An alternative theory, the perceived market feel hypothesis, suggests 
that analysts acquire greater influence as their tenure increases because fund managers interpret their experience 
as a signal of quality. According to this view, analysts with greater tenure are perceived by fund managers to 
possess some intangible ‘feel for the market’ gained through many years of experience that makes their 
recommendations more informative. While the present study affords no opportunity to distinguish between these 
hypotheses, identifying the direction of causality in this relation poses an interesting challenge for further 
research. 
 
4.4  Analyst skill and influence 
 
In this section we examine whether recommendations issued by analysts included in the Institutional Investor 
All-American Research Team exert more influence on the trading of mutual funds than those of their less heralded 
peers. Table 10 presents the results of this analysis. The first row of the table presents the mean and median 
influence rank, tenure, and matched trades of analysts included on the Institutional Investor All-American 
Research Team (All-Americans) at least once during the sample period. The second row presents the results for 
those analysts who are not All-Americans in any year of the sample. The last row of the table reports the 
difference between the mean scores of All-American and other analysts. 
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Table 10: The relative influence of All-American analysts and other analysts 
This table compares the mean and median influence ranks, tenure and matched trades of analysts included in the Institutional Investor All-
American Research Team during the sample period with those of other analysts. We define an analyst as All-American if they appear on the 
Institutional Investor All-America Research Team at least once during the sample period. The Mean influence rank proxies for an analyst’s 
relative influence on the trading of mutual funds and is estimated as follows. First, we regress the quarterly change in a fund’s holdings of a 
stock, ΔHoldingi,k,t against the control variables from equation (9) in order to estimate the expected change in holdings associated with 
factors other than an analyst’s recommendation changes. We then regress the residuals from this regression on the recommendation change 
indicator variables and estimate the Cook’s D influence measures associated with the coefficients. Next, we compute an average Cook’s D 
influence measure across all stocks covered by an analyst within a quarter, and assign each analyst a percentile ranking based on the 
average Cook’s D statistic associated with their recommendations within the quarter. Finally, we average an analyst’s quarterly percentile 
rankings longitudinally across the sample period. Tenure measures the number of quarters in which an analyst appears in the database, 
while Trades measures the number of mutual fund trades that an analyst’s recommendations are matched with in a quarter. The sample 
consists of 6,535,255 observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. *, ** and *** indicate that the 
difference between the mean statistics for the above- and below-median influence groups are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels respectively. 
 N Mean influence rank 
 (%) 
Median influence rank 
(%) 
Tenure  
(quarters) 
Matched trades 
All-American analysts 476 52.06 53.30 13.36 215.13 
Other analysts 4,358 47.58 48.32 7.74 116.23 
All-American – other  - 4.48*** 4.98 5.62*** 98.9*** 
 
The results are consistent with the notion that recommendations issued by All-American analysts exert greater 
influence on the trading of mutual funds than those issued by their less highly acclaimed peers. The mean 
influence rank amongst All-Americans is 52 percent, while that of other analysts is 48 percent. The difference, 
approximately four percent, is statistically significant at less than the one percent level. Although highly 
statistically significant, it is not immediately clear that this difference is economically significant. However, 
analysis of the relative trade statistics of All-American and other analysts brings the economic significance of this 
difference sharply into focus. On average, recommendation changes issued by an All-American analyst are 
matched with almost one hundred more trades by mutual funds each quarter than those issued by an analyst who 
is not an All-American. The correlations presented in Table 11 confirm this finding. The Pearson correlation 
between an analyst’s status as an All-American and the influence they exert on the trading of mutual funds is 
positive (0.126) and significant at less than the one percent level. 
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Table 11: Pearson and Spearman correlations between analyst influence, All-American status, tenure and 
trades 
This table presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between an analyst’s mean influence rank, their status as an All-American research 
analyst, tenure and matched trades. The mean influence ranking proxies for an analyst’s relative influence on the trading of mutual funds 
and is estimated as follows: First, we regress the quarterly change in a fund’s holdings of a stock, ΔHoldingi,k,t against the control variables 
from equation (9) in order to estimate the expected change in holdings associated with factors other than an analyst’s recommendation 
changes. We then regress the residuals from this regression on the recommendation change indicator variables and estimate the Cook’s D 
influence measures associated with the coefficients. Next, we compute an average Cook’s D influence measure across all stocks covered by 
an analyst within a quarter, and assign each analyst a percentile ranking based on their relative scores within the quarter. Finally, to obtain a 
measure of an analyst’s influence across the entire sample, we average the analyst’s percentile rank longitudinally throughout the sample 
period. All-American is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if an analyst appears on the Institutional Investor All-American 
Research Team at least once during the sample period and 0 otherwise. Tenure measures the number of quarters in which an analyst 
appears in the database, while Trades measures the number of cases in which an analyst’s recommendation changes were matched with the 
change in holdings of a mutual fund. The sample consists of 6,535,255 observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the 
final quarter of 2008. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the bottom left corner of the Table and Spearman correlation 
coefficients are reported in the upper right corner. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.  
 Mean influence rank All-American Tenure Matched trades 
Mean  influence rank 1.000 0.070*** 0.132*** 0.354*** 
All-American 0.064*** 1.000 0.254*** 0.273*** 
Tenure 0.126*** 0.263*** 1.000 0.488*** 
Trades 0.302*** 0.211*** 0.347*** 1.000 
 
Consistent with the results in Table 8, the more influential All-American analysts exhibit significantly greater 
tenure than their less acclaimed peers. On average, All-American analysts appear in the sample in approximately 
13 of the 22 quarters. In contrast, other analysts appear in the sample an average of eight times. Moreover, the 
results in Table 11 indicate that there is a significant positive correlation between an analyst’s tenure and their 
inclusion in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team. Note, however, that this finding reveals 
nothing about the direction of causality in the relation between analyst influence and tenure. Analysts are included 
in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team on the basis that fund managers believe them to exhibit 
superior skills to their peers. It is therefore possible that the greater tenure of the influential All-American analysts 
is driven by their greater skills, which ensure that they continue to be employed and remain in the sample. 
Equally, however, it is consistent with the notion that analysts acquire influence and are more likely to become an 
All-American as their tenure increases.  
5. Granger causality  
It is well documented in the literature that changes in institutional ownership are positively associated with 
future stock returns (Lakonishok et al., 1992). It is therefore possible that institutional trading causes changes in 
analyst recommendations as opposed to analyst recommendations informing the trading of mutual funds. We 
confront this threat by including an analyst’s recommendation change in the prior quarter as an independent 
variable in the regression analysis. By flow of time, therefore, any relation between mutual fund trading in the 
current quarter and an analyst’s recommendation change in the prior quarter must flow from the analyst’s 
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recommendation change to the trading of mutual funds. In reality, however, the contemporaneous relation 
between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendation changes may flow in the opposite direction. 
Alternatively, the true relation may be described by a complex feedback process in which the trading of mutual 
funds causes analysts to change their recommendations and analyst recommendation changes cause mutual funds 
to trade. To examine these issues, we adopt the approach advocated by Granger (1969) and conduct a series of 
tests to determine the direction of causality in the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst 
recommendation changes.  
The bi-variate Granger causality model between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendation 
changes can be expressed as follows: 
 , , 0 1 2 , , 1 , ,
1 1
n n
i k t t i t i i k t i k t
i i
Holding Upgrade Downgrade Lag Holding  (11) 
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i
Downgrade Holding Lag downgrade  (13) 
In this analysis a finding that β1 and β2 are significantly different from zero is consistent with the notion that 
changes in analyst recommendations Granger cause changes in mutual fund holdings. Equally, significant 
coefficients on δ1 and φ1 would be consistent with mutual fund trading Granger causing changes in analyst 
recommendations. Finally, a finding that β1, β2, δ1 and φ1 are all significantly different from zero would be 
consistent with the notion that the relation between analyst recommendation changes and mutual fund trading is 
described by a feedback system in which analyst recommendation changes cause mutual funds to trade and 
mutual fund trading causes analyst recommendation changes. 
The results of the Granger causality tests, presented in Table 12, indicate the existence of a feedback relation 
between analyst recommendation changes and the trading of mutual funds. The flow of causality from analyst 
recommendations to the trading of mutual funds is supported by the significantly positive coefficients on 
Upgradej,k,t and Lag upgradej,k,t-1 and the significantly negative coefficients on Downgradej,k,t  and Lag 
downgradej,k,t-1 in the first model. Equally, the significant coefficients on ΔHoldingi,k,t and Lag ΔHoldingi,k,t-1 in the 
second and third model are consistent with a flow of causality from the trading of mutual funds to the 
recommendation changes of sell side analysts. The existence of this previously undocumented bi-directional 
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causality suggests that the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations is 
considerably more complex than has previously been acknowledged. 
Table 12: Granger causality tests 
This table presents tests of the direction of causality between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations. 
The first column describes the independent variables in each specification. Columns 2 – 4 set out the average quarterly 
coefficients of regressions with alternate dependent variables. In the second column, the dependent variable is ΔHoldingi,k,t. 
the change in the proportion of fund i’s total net assets invested in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t, adjusted to remove the 
impact of price changes in the stocks comprising the fund’s portfolio and  changes in funds under management associated with 
redemptions and new investment. It is computed as , where,  
, 
and  Nt  is the number of shares held by fund i in stock k , Pt-1 is the price of stock k as at the date the fund reported its holdings 
in quarter t-1 and ωi,k,t-1  is the unadjusted proportion of fund i’s total net assets invested in stock k at the end of quarter t, as 
reported by CRSP. In the third column, the dependent variable is Upgradej,k,t, an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
analyst j’s recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. In 
the fourth column, the dependent variable is Downgradej,k,t, an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j’s 
recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less favourable that that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. All regressions 
are estimated based on a sample of 6,535,255 quarterly observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the 
final quarter of 2008. *,**,*** indicate that a coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
Independent variables ΔHolding Upgrade Downgrade 
Intercept -0.045*** 0.346*** 0.375*** 
Upgrade 0.007***   
Lag upgrade 0.003*** -0.323***  
Downgrade -0.008***   
Lag downgrade -0.002***  -0.350*** 
ΔHolding  0.015*** -0.016*** 
Lag ΔHolding -0.140*** 0.006*** -0.016*** 
F-test 763.65 584.75 774.03 
p-value (F-test) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.55 10.72 12.29 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The literature surrounding the influence of sell-side analyst recommendations on the trading of mutual funds 
has been characterised by a divide between the empirical and survey evidence. The survey evidence consistently 
records the claims of funds managers that although they value other aspects of sell-side analyst research, they 
assign little weight to analyst recommendations when making portfolio decisions. Survey responses, however, are 
not always a reliable indicator of actual behaviour. Indeed, in one of the few empirical studies to address this 
question, Chen and Cheng (2006) report a strong contemporaneous relation between changes in aggregate 
institutional ownership and the consensus recommendation for a stock. However, making robust inferences about 
the direction of causality in the contemporaneous relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst 
recommendations is problematic. The contemporaneous relation that Chen and Cheng (2006) describe could 
equally be consistent with analysts changing their recommendations in response to institutional trading. Our study 
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therefore meets the pressing need to undertake definitive, large-sample empirical analysis to understand the 
behaviour of these important capital market participants.  
We focus on three fundamental questions surrounding the manner in which mutual funds use the research of 
sell-side analysts. First, do mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with analyst recommendation changes? 
Second, do mutual funds persistently trade in a manner consistent with the recommendation changes of certain 
influential analysts? And finally, do the analysts rated most by fund managers in the Institutional Investor surveys 
exhibit greater influence on the trading of mutual funds than other analysts? 
To address the first research question, we draw on the rich panel of individual mutual fund holdings and 
detailed analyst recommendations. In contrast, prior studies consider only changes in aggregate institutional 
ownership and consensus recommendations. While we undertake analysis at this level, we also extend the 
literature by conducting the analysis at the individual fund and analyst level. An implication of this research 
design is that our study is by far the most comprehensive of the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst 
recommendations undertaken to date. Moreover, our study is the first in this stream of literature to incorporate the 
prior quarter recommendation change as an independent variable in the regression analysis. This secures the 
validity of inferences as to the direction of causality in the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst 
recommendations, as prior quarter recommendation changes cannot be influenced by trades executed by fund 
managers in the subsequent quarter.  
The results that emerge from this robust research design provide compelling evidence that mutual funds trade 
in a manner consistent with consensus and individual analyst recommendation changes. This finding contradicts 
the claims of fund managers that they take little notice of analyst recommendations when determining the 
composition of their portfolios. It therefore highlights the importance of undertaking large-sample empirical 
analysis to understand the complex behaviour of investors. 
Furthermore, to examine the possibility of reverse causality or a feedback relation between mutual fund 
trading, we estimate a series of Granger causality tests. The results of this analysis suggest that the relation 
between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations is considerably more complex than has previously 
been acknowledged in the literature. In particular, we find that there is a feedback relation between changes in 
mutual fund holdings and recommendation changes. 
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We adopt a two-stage least squares regression framework to test whether analysts identified as most influential 
in a pre-test period continue to exhibit greater influence than their peers during the test period. The results of this 
analysis support the hypothesis that the most influential analysts exhibit persistence in their influence on the 
trading of mutual funds in subsequent periods.  
Finally, our results provide a clue as to the characteristics of analysts who exert the greatest influence on the 
trading of mutual funds. We find that analysts rated most highly by portfolio managers in the Institutional 
Investor surveys exert significantly greater influence on the trading of these managers than their less heralded 
peers. Moreover, we find a strong positive relation between an analyst’s tenure, the influence they exert on the 
trading of mutual funds and their status as an All-American analyst.  
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